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期刊名称：《Journal of Political Economy》(政治经济学期刊)影响因子：8.2期刊分类：ECONOMICS 经济学Top分区：是 Q1出版周期：月刊当前期数：2023 Vol 131, No 9今日有更新期刊：《旅游学刊》、《Journal of Public Economics》、《Journal of Economic Pespective》、《Journal of Political Economy》、《Journal of Financial Economics》、《财政研究》、《Journal of the Association of Environment and Resource Economics》（公众号更新部分期刊信息）

目录

01. Firm-Embedded Productivity and Cross-Country Income Differences

02. Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk

03. No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress

04. Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves

05. Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics

06. Trade, Technology, and Agricultural Productivity

07. The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare

内容提要

01. Firm-Embedded Productivity and Cross-Country Income Differences

作者：VanessaAlviarez 等

摘要：We measure the contribution of firm-embedded productivity to cross-country income differences. By firm-embedded productivity we refer to firm-specific components of productivity, such as blueprints, management practices, and other intangible capital. Using micro-level data for multinational enterprises (MNEs), we compare market shares of the same MNE in different countries and document that they are systematically larger in less developed countries. This indicates that MNEs face less competition and that firm-embedded productivity is scarce in these countries. We implement a measure of firm-embedded productivity based on this observation. Differences in firm-embedded productivity account for one-third of the cross-country variance in output per worker in our sample.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

02. Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk

作者：JavierBianchi 等

摘要：What is the optimal fiscal policy response to a recession when the government is subject to sovereign risk? We study this question in a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities. Increasing spending in a recession reduces unemployment, but it exposes the government to a debt crisis. We quantitatively analyze this trade-off between stimulus and austerity and find that expanding government spending may be undesirable, even in the presence of sizable Keynesian stabilization gains and inequality concerns. Consistent with these findings, we show that sovereign risk is a key driver of the fiscal procyclicality observed worldwide.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

03. No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress

作者：Eoin F.McGuirk 等

摘要：We study agency frictions in the US Congress. We examine the long-standing hypothesis that political elites engage in conflict because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We compare the voting behavior of legislators with draft age sons versus draft age daughters during the conscription-era wars of the twentieth century. We estimate that having a draft age son reduces proconscription voting by 7–11 percentage points. Support for conscription recovers when a legislator’s son ages out of eligibility. We establish that agency problems contribute to political conflict and that politicians are influenced by private incentives orthogonal to political concerns or ideological preferences.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

04. Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves

作者：DorukCetemen 等

摘要：We introduce a framework for studying collective search by teams. Discoveries are correlated over time and governed by a Brownian path, where search speed is jointly controlled. Agents individually choose when to cease search and implement their best discovery. We characterize equilibrium and optimal policies. Search speeds are constant within active alliances and depend on complementarities between members. A drawdown stopping boundary governs each agent’s search termination. The consequent exit waves, whereby possibly heterogeneous agents cease search simultaneously, exhibit deterministic sequencing but stochastic timing. We highlight environments with lower than optimal equilibrium speeds and search durations, and different exit waves.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

05. Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics

作者：ArjadaBardhi 等

摘要：A policymaker selects aminipublic—a group of citizens from a demographically diverse citizenry with access to local evidence about the impact of a policy. Citizens face uncertainty about the policymaker’s eventual policy bias, which is shown to discourage the most marginally informative minipublic citizens from discovering their evidence. We fully characterize the optimal minipublic composition. Relative to the most demographically representative minipublic, the optimal minipublic overrepresents demographics at the margins of the citizenry while underrepresenting those around the median citizen. The representativeness of the optimal minipublic varies nonmonotonically with uncertainty. Our findings bear practical implications for minipublic design.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

06. Trade, Technology, and Agricultural Productivity

作者：FaridFarrokhi 等

摘要：We examine the contribution of trade to the rise of modern agriculture, taking into account interactions between trade, input requirements, and technology adoption. We develop and estimate a new multicountry general equilibrium model that incorporates producers’ choices of which crops to produce and with which technologies at the level of grid cells covering the earth’s surface. We find that trade cost reductions in agricultural inputs and the international transmission of productivity growth in the agricultural input sector since the 1980s induced large shifts from traditional, labor-intensive technologies to modern, input-intensive ones, with important global and distributional implications for productivity and welfare.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

07. The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare

作者：MarcFleurbaey 等

摘要：The stakeholder (or responsible) firm maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of the surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). Although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely on constrained profit maximization. Unconstrained profit maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. Long-term entry decisions should rely on profit modified by Pigouvian pricing of externalities, and this result provides a novel justification for the polluter-pays principle.

文章链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jpe/current

end

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